the U.S. charged China with violating its obligations under the Trade Related Aspects of
International Property Rights (TRIPS) 7 Agreement. The U.S. brought three claims concerning copyright, customs, and criminal law. 8 In January of 2009, the WTO panel found a number of shortcomings in the protection of IPRs in China that were incompatible with TRIPS obligations. 9 According to the WTO panel, it is a violation of TRIPS for China to refuse copyright protection of works that do not meet China's legal standards. 10 Additionally, simply removing an infringing trademark as the only precondition for the sale at public auction of counterfeit goods seized by Chinese customs authorities was found impermissible. 11 The panel, however, found insufficient evidence to conclude that China's threshold for prosecution in its criminal law was a violation of TRIPS. 12 Both parties accepted the panel's findings, and China negotiated with the U.S. to implement the recommendations by March of 2010. 13 The country to comply with internationally mandated obligations, such as TRIPS, may not be the U.S.'s best approach to fighting counterfeiting and piracy. Therefore, this article seeks to propose a better alternative: China should be allowed time to develop into a country which is better equipped to enforce IPRs and fully comply with its TRIPS obligations.
II. ENFORCEMENT OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT

A. THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
In most countries, copyright piracy and trademark counterfeiting are considered crimes.
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There are differences, however, in the ways that countries enforce their IPR laws.
The TRIPS Agreement was negotiated as part of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations in 1986, 16 and after seven years of highly contentious negotiations, the agreement was signed in 1994 and came into force on January 1, 1995. 17 As a result of the emergence of TRIPS, the main forum for rulemaking shifted from the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), a specialized United Nations agency dedicated to promoting the protection of IP around the world,
18
"to the newly created [WTO] , and [the agreement] transform[ed] the substantive rules" of previous international IP standards. 19 The TRIPS Agreement represented the "furthest reach of multilateral harmonization [and] [integration] efforts," and from the perspective of developed countries, the substantive terms of the TRIPS Agreement were desirable and more protective than existing international IP accords.
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While it adopted many provisions of previous multilateral treaties administered under WIPO, such as 
B. ENFORCEMENT OF TRIPS BY THE WTO: DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCESS
With the emergence of the TRIPS Agreement within the WTO framework, a new centralized procedure for resolving IP-related disputes was introduced: the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). 32 Article 64.1 of TRIPS grants members access to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism for disputes arising under TRIPS. 33 The DSU lays out a structured procedure for dispute resolution arising under the WTO. The WTO contains a single unified body that administers all disputes, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). 34 Panels of governmental and nongovernmental individuals who objectively assess the facts of each case and apply the necessary rules to make recommendations or rulings assist the DSB. 35 Furthermore, the DSU allows parties to appeal a panel's decision to the Appellate Body, a permanent entity consisting of seven judges. 36 The DSU automatically adopts the report of the panel and Appellate Body, 37 unless there is a unanimous objection within a reasonable timeframe. 38 The DSB will request that the offending member remedy the inconsistency if a panel or the Appellate Body rules that a particular measure is inconsistent with a member's treaty obligations. 39 If the losing party fails to implement the recommendations and the rulings within a reasonable time, the DSU allows for compensation and the suspension of concessions or treaty obligations as remedial measures. 40 Despite previously having had membership in WTO's predecessor, the General Agreement 50 It also argued that its copyright enforcement procedures were available for right holders of any work to go to court and seek remedies. 
B. SECOND CLAIM: CUSTOMS MEASURES
In its second claim, the U.S. contended that China's Customs Law was inconsistent with
Articles 46 and 59 of the TRIPS Agreement 68 because the law created a scheme giving Chinese customs authorities the option of disposing IP-infringing goods seized at the border instead of destroying the goods, thereby encouraging the infringing goods to enter the channels of commerce. 69 China responded that in reading Article 59 of TRIPS in conjunction with Article 1.1 of TRIPS, its customs officers possessed flexibility and had wide discretion to determine whether its obligation under Article 59 was met. 70 The Customs IPR Regulations and relevant Implementation Measures and Public Notices set out that confiscated goods shall be handled in the following order:
1. donating the goods to public welfare bodies or assigning the goods to the IP rights holder with compensation; 2. auctioning the goods after completely eradicating the infringing features and packaging of the goods; and 3. destroying the goods if the infringing features cannot be eradicated.
Article 59 of TRIPS in relevant part provides as follows:
[C]ompetent authorities shall have the authority to order the destruction or disposal of infringing goods in accordance with the principles set out in Article 46 . . . .
Article 46 of TRIPS provides as follows:
In order to create an effective deterrent to infringement, the judicial authorities shall have the authority to order that goods that they have found to be infringing be, without compensation of any sort, disposed of outside the channels of commerce in such a manner as to avoid any harm caused to the right holder, or, unless this would be contrary to existing constitutional requirements, destroyed. . . In regard to counterfeit trademark goods, the simple removal of the trademark unlawfully affixed shall not be sufficient, other than in exceptional cases, to permit release of the goods into the channels of commerce. 72 The panel found that Article 59 of TRIPS only obliged competent authorities to have the authority to make certain orders -"'destruction or disposal.'" 73 The panel said that remedies ordered "'in such a manner as to avoid any harm caused to the right holders'" found in Article 46 of TRIPS was only applicable when the infringing products were disposed outside the channels of commerce. 74 According to the panel, if goods were sold for charitable distribution, "the goods were not in fact disposed of outside the channels of commerce but into the channels of commerce." Since the disposal of infringing goods outside the channels of commerce was an alternative to destruction of the goods, 77 "any inherent risk of harm due simply to the fact that the goods had not been completely destroyed [was] insufficient to disqualify a disposal method, as it would nullify the choice between disposal and destruction." 78 The panel also found no evidence that customs authorities would donate defective or dangerous goods to charity since Chinese law required the confiscated goods to be used for social public welfare and could not be used to the detriment of public interest. 79 In situations where goods were donated to organizations like the American Red
Cross, the recipients would not likely be misled to the origin of the goods, nor would it lead to damaging or harming a right holder's reputation. 80 Therefore, the panel concluded that the U.S.
failed to demonstrate that Customs lacked authority to donate goods to social welfare bodies in such a manner as to avoid any harm to the right holder caused by lower quality goods. 81 The panel also upheld the use of sales and auctions as legitimate disposal options.
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However, in situations where counterfeit trademark goods were being released into the channels of commence, TRIPS required more than the simple removal of the trademark, except in exceptional cases. 83 In this regard, according to the panel, China's customs measures violated Article 46 of TRIPS, which stated that "the simple removal of the trademark unlawfully affixed
[was] sufficient to permit release of the goods into the channels of commerce," allowing release of goods into the channels of commerce "in more than just 'exceptional cases. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE U.S.-CHINA WTO IP CASE
Although it appears that the U.S. has prevailed in the majority of its claims, the victory seems to be rather meaningless for the U.S in terms of actual curtailing of the piracy and counterfeiting levels in China. After tracking the development of IPRs in China and analyzing the repeated attempts by the U.S. government to enforce IP laws there, it can be strongly suggested that even had the WTO panel ruled in favor of the U.S., finding that China had violated its obligations under TRIPS on all three claims, this ruling would have had minimal impact on China actually satisfying the U.S.'s notion of adequate IPR protection and TRIPS compliance. Minimal amendment of Chinese laws, in reality, will not fight against counterfeiting and piracy.
A. IMMEDIATE EFFECTS
At this juncture, China does not have to change its criminal prosecution thresholds for IP violations under TRIPS. From the U.S. perspective, China will continue to lack enforcement on its criminal side by maintaining "safe harbor" provisions, which will allow criminals to commit the IP infringement below the specified threshold without the fear of legal prosecution. 104 The bigger problem, however, seems to be that despite the panel's rulings that found China's copyright protection and its customs disposal system of counterfeited goods to be in violation of its obligations under TRIPS, 105 implementing the recommendations of the panel in order for China to comply with TRIPS will not be burdensome on China. Implementing the recommendations will involve amending and changing laws and regulations on their face, rather than China having to change its application or enforcement of existing laws. Winning a favorable WTO ruling in this DS362 dispute, however, will most likely not result in the desired effect of dropping piracy and counterfeiting rates. The problem at issue does not seem to arise from China's reluctance to amend and enact domestic laws, giving higher IPRs, but rather from China's failure to enforce such laws.
In the past, China has significantly changed its written IP laws to comply with the WTO obligations under TRIPS. 
B. U.S. REACTION TO CHINA'S IP ENFORCEMENT
The author's contention that bringing China to the WTO forum to resolve counterfeiting and piracy under TRIPS will have no immediate and desirable effect is further strengthened if one analyzes the historical steps that the U.S. employed against China. History teaches the U.S. that imposing economic sanctions or imposing threatened power will not effectively deter counterfeiting and piracy activities. 117 The preambles to these laws, however, offered foreigners very little IP protection. 129 and a similar agreement in 1996. 130 Nevertheless, piracy and counterfeiting remained widespread in China. The rampant piracy in China led to a loss of approximately $2 billion of revenues annually for the U.S. in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 131 "According to one industry estimate, 99% of all computer software in China was pirated in the late 1990s." 132 The USTR has continuously put China under its Priority Watch List and threatened unilateral actions against China for its inadequate IP protection. 133 (1) adhere to certain levels of IP protection for patents, trade secrets, computer programs and sound recordings; (2) accede to a number of important international intellectual property treaties, such as the Berne Convention . . . ; and (3) provide effective border control procedures and remedies. 136 Although this Memorandum did result in new Chinese legislation for its copyright law, there was a lack of improved enforcement, as "piracy levels still remained among the highest in the world". 137 The U.S., once again dissatisfied, labeled China a priority foreign country under Special 301 and threatened once more to impose strong trade sanctions. 138 Further talks eventually led to the 1995 Memorandum of Understanding, which among other things required China to reduce piracy and improve enforcement. This again was ineffective. 139 The widespread optimism among commentators that piracy and counterfeiting problems in China would effectively be resolved by filing a WTO complaint against China, demanding compliance under TRIPS, is understandable. The possibility for enforcement of the WTO dispute settlement decisions by withdrawal of trade concessions was one of the factors that motivated the U.S. to select the WTO as the alternative forum to WIPO. The benefits of the WTO system also included stability in the international trading system and a focus on rules rather than coercion. China operates according to its interests, not foreign threats of economic or trade sanctions.
The only way the WTO dispute settlement system seems to work effectively is through the good faith participation and cooperation of its members to assure that the system works properly. China had a purpose when it acceded into the WTO regime, focusing on the importance of trade considerations. As such, China knows that it will be in its interest that the WTO system function effectively, since it will not only be a respondent in the system, but will also be a complainant for future disputes. 153 Therefore, China will be keen to reform and enforce its own law so that it is compatible with international frameworks of IP protection when its interests are at risk. Some scholars have hypothesized that the problem with enforcement lies in the Chinese intellectual property legal system, which places emphasis on compromise and harmony. These commentators argues that the system is ill-suited for the strong litigation that is necessary to enforce and defend IPRs in a market economy. 155 Consequently, instead of allowing the individuals take part in the enforcement process, the Chinese government has chosen to deal with enforcement of IPR as a state-regulated matter. 156 "The underlying view is that the legal system is one of many policy tools that the government disposes of . . . . Hence, the majority of copyright infringement cases are dealt with administratively." enforcement. 159 The U.S. once stated that China faces a "failure of will . . . not a failure of ability,"
when it comes to enforcement of its copyright laws. 160 To promote this, the U.S. evidenced that national government officials as well as local and national political leaders were involved and/or responsible for various pirating and counterfeiting undertakings. 161 The corrupt Chinese officials would have no incentive to enforce copyright laws that would result in a loss of profits from pirated goods.
While it is true that China has been slow in reforming its IP regime, many commentators ignore the developments of IPR in the country that were implemented after its entry into the WTO.
In 2002, the Chinese government initiated an anti-counterfeiting and anti-piracy campaign, which resulted in high numbers of seizures of infringing goods. 162 With the assistance of the Chinese percent increase in applications from Chinese domestic entities, and during the period from 2000 to 2006, China's share of worldwide patent fillings rose from 1.8 percent to 7.3 percent". 167 During the same years, the total amount of patent applications filed worldwide by Chinese companies increased by 32.1 percent. 168 The Chinese have begun to realize the importance of a well-developed information economy and to notice the benefits of protecting IPRs, especially as more Chinese now understand the consequences of inadequate IP protection and how the lack of IP protection could gravely damage their country and its international reputation. The U.S., as well as many commentators, should acknowledge that, unlike its previous position which considered IPR as a bargaining chip, China is beginning to realize that IPRs can help promote national growth and prosperity.
In the light of these developments, the author proposes that the U.S. should wait and allow
China to evolve into a country that is better ready to enforce IPRs. Historically, many less developed countries, including the U.S., which was a haven for the pirated works of Charles Dickens, 169 as well as newly emerging industrialized countries, including Singapore and South Korea, 170 experienced extensive significant piracy and counterfeiting activities before they reformed their intellectual property laws. In fact, the U.S. was one of the more notorious pirating nations in the world in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 171 Section 5 of the 1790 Copyright Act, the country's first copyright statute, stated explicitly that, noting in this act shall be construed to extend to prohibit the importation or vending, reprinting or publishing within the United States, of any map, chart, book or books, written, Congress did not extend copyright protection to foreign authors until more than a century later and only to those countries that offered the U.S. reciprocal copyright protection. 173 As the former Register of Copyrights, Barbara Ringer, summarized: "Until the Second World War the United States had little reason to take pride in its international copyright relations . . . its role in international copyright was marked by intellectual shortsightedness, political isolationism, and narrow economic self-interest." [R]apid economic growth is more often associated with weaker IP protection. In technologically advanced developing countries, there is some evidence that IP protection becomes important at a stage of development, but that stage is not until a country is well into the category of upper middle income developing countries. 176 
